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by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and as such 
receive only limited scientific review. Views or opinions contained 
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National Member Organizations supporting the Institute. 

PREFACE 
One of IIASA1s aims is the development and application of methods of 
investigation and analysis for treating problems of contemporary societies. 
As a part of the System and Decision Sciences task in mathematical economics, 
Professor Martin Shubik was invited to give a series of lectures on the 
theory of money and financial institutions. 
This paper was written to accompany the lectures. It contains a listing, 
together with brief summaries, of published and preliminary papers dealing 
with the topic of a macro-economic process approach to the theory of money 
and financial institutions. The approach is essentially via methods suggested 
by the theory of games and oligopoly theory. The purpose of this paper is 
to provide a brief set of guidelines to a reader interested in considering 
this approach to the theory. 

ABSTRACT 
The b a s i c  i d e a s  behind a  new approach t o  modeling money and f i n a n c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  summarized. A l i s t i n g  i s  g iven  of a  s e t  of  i n t e r - r e l a t e d  
pape r s  on t h i s  s u b j e c t  by  t h e  a u t h o r ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  c a p s u l e  summaries of each  
which can  s e r v e  a s  a  gu ide  and i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  s u b j e c t .  Var ious  unsolved 
problems and d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  a r e  sugges ted .  
Th i s  paper  was w r i t t e n  t o  accompany a  s e r i e s  of l e c t u r e s  g iven  by 
P r o f e s s o r  Mar t in  Shubik a t  ILASA i n  A p r i l  and May 1977. 

A THEORY OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
1. INTXODUCTORY NOTES 
On t h e  fol lowing pages is  a  l i s t i n g  of publ ished and p re l iminary  papers  
d e a l i n g  wi th  t h e  t o p i c  of a  micro economic process  approach t o  t h e  theory  
of money and f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The approach i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  v i a  methods 
suggested by t h e  theory of games and by o l igopoly  theory .  
Considerable  s t r e s s  i s  l a i d  upon informat ion c o n d i t i o n s  and an e x p l i c i t  
d e s c r i p t i o n  of p rocess  invo lv ing  i tems such a s  p r i c e  format ion and t h e  ex- 
p l i c i t  mechanisms f o r  t r a d e  wi th  va r ious  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
book. 
d i f  f  i 
The papers  r e f e r r e d  t o  h e r e  a r e  p re l iminary  m a t e r i a l  f o r  a  p ro jec ted  
Not a l l  of them should be  regarded a s  a  f i n i s h e d  work. The modeling 
c u l t i e s  and t h e  mathematical  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r e  cons iderab le .  With 
r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  l a t t e r ,  I have been f o r t u n a t e  t o  have had t h e  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  
of s e v e r a l  co l l eagues ,  e s p e c i a l l y  Lloyd Shapley and Pradeep Dubey. 
It  i s  my b e l i e f ,  however, t h a t  mathematization of a  s u b j e c t  f requen t ly  
fol lows t h e  fo rmula t ion  of t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  models hence it would be o v e r l y  
s t u l t i f y i n g  t o  l i m i t  t h e  fo rmula t ion  of models t o  inc lude  on ly  those  which 
can  be  solved by immediately a v a i l a b l e  mathematics. 
The l i s t  of p u b l i c a t i o n s  i s  div ided  i n t o  two p a r t s ,  t h e  f i r s t  c o n s i s t i n g  
of a r t i c l e s  a l r e a d y  publ ished,  bear ing  on money and f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
and t h e  second con ta in ing  a  l i s t  of working papers .  
I n  a  previous  v e r s i o n  of t h e s e  n o t e s  a  l i s t  of e a r l i e r  p u b l i c a t i o n s  was 
included t o  provide a  s k e t c h  of t h e  con tex t  of t h e  work which l e d  me t o  adopt 
t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  approach. Needless t o  say my i n t e l l e c t u a l  debt  t o  t h e  works 
of Cournot, Edgeworth, and von Neumann and Morgenstern i s  enormous. I am 
e s p e c i a l l y  indebted t o  D r .  Lloyd Shapley w i t h  whom I have worked and d i scussed  
t h e s e  m a t t e r s  f o r  many y e a r s  and t o  Pradeep Dubey who ha's worked i n t e n s i v e l y  
wi th  me i n  t h e  l a s t  e i g h t e e n  months. I could l i s t  dozens of o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  
and r e f e r e n c e s  who have helped shape t h i s  approach, however, t h e  purpose of 
t h i s  n o t e  i s  t o  provide a  r e l a t i v e l y  b r i e f  s e t  of g u i d e l i n e s  t o  a  reader  who 
may be i n t e r e s t e d  i n  cons ider ing  t h i s  approach t o  a  theory of money and 
f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  b u t  i s  n o t  i n c l i n e d  t o  wade through an enormous number 
of a r t i c l e s  which have no t  y e t  been i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  a  s i n g l e  work. 
2. PUBLICATIONS AND WORKING PAPERS 
Publications 
1. "On Different Methods for Allocating Resources," Kyklos, XXIII, 2 
(1970), pp. 332-337. 
2. "Pecuniary Externalities: A Game Theoretic Analysis," American 
Economic Review, LXI, 4 (September 1971), pp.713-718 (CFP 355*, CFDP 288**). 
3. "Fiat Money and Noncooperative Equilibrium in a Closed Economy," 
~nternational Journal bf Game  heo or^, 1, 4 (1971/72), pp 243-268. 
(Earlier version CFDP 330. ) 
4. "Fiat Money in an Economy with One Nondurable Good and No Credit 
(A Noncooperative Sequential ~ame):' with W. Whitt. TOPICS IN 
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES, ed. A. Blaquiere, North-Holland Publishing Co., 
1973, pp. 401-448. (Also CFP 389, earlier version CFDP 355, 3/6/73.) 
5. "Commodity Money, Oligopoly, Credit and Bankruptcy in a General 
Equilibrium Model," Western Economic Journal, X, 4 (December 1972), 
pp 24-38. (Also CFP 391, earlier versions CFDP 324, RAND p-4686.) 
6. 11 Information, Duopoly and Competitive Markets: A Sensitivity Analysis," 
Kyklos, 26, 4 (1973), pp 736-761. (Also CFP 400, earlier versions CFDP 
347 and Technische Hochschule, Vienna, RM-3, June 1972.) 
7. "The General Equilibrium Model: Barter and Trust or Mass Markets with 
Money and credit," Economic Record (1974) (earlier version University 
of Melbourne RM 4, July 1973), 50, pp 245-258. 
8. "Money, Trust and Equilibrium Points in Games in Extensive Form," 
Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 34 (1974), pp 365-385. 
9. "Competitive and Controlled Price Economies," EQUILIBRIUM AND DIS- 
EQUILIBRIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY, ed. G. Schwodiauer, Proceedings of a 
conference held in Vienna, July 1974 (forthcoming, 1977), (Also 
CFDP 337 revised). 
10. "A Dynamic Economy with Fiat Money without Banking but with Ownership 
Claims to Production Goods," Melanges Francois Perroux, Grenobles, 
(forthcoming, 1977) . 
11. "A Trading Model to Avoid Tatonnement Metaphysics," STUDIES IN GAME 
THEORY AND MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, Bidding and Auctioning for Procure- 
ment and Allocation, Y. Amihud (ed.) New York, NYU Press, 1976, 129-142. 
(Also CFDP 368 revised.) 
12. "On the Eight Basic Units of a Dynamic Economy Controlled by Financial 
Institutions," The Review of Income and Wealth, Series 21, No. 2 
(June 1975), pp 183-201. 
13. "The General Equilibrium Model is Incomplete and Not Adequate for 
the Reconciliation of Micro and Macroeconomic Theory," Kyklos, 28, 
(1975), pp 545-573. (Also CFP 432.) 
* Cowles Foundation Paper. 
** Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper. 
"On the Role of Numbers and Information in competition," Revue 
Economique, 26, 4 (1975), pp 605-621. 
"Mathematical Models for a Theory of Money and Financial Institutions" 
ADAPTIVE ECONOMIC MODELS, ed. Richard H. Day and Theodore Groves, 
Academic Press, 1975, pp 513-74. 
"A Noncooperative Model of a Closed Economy with Many Traders and 
Two Bankers," Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, , 1976, 10-18. 
"Competitive Equilibrium, Contingent Commodities and Information," 
Journal of Finance, forthcoming, 1977. 
"Beyond General Equilibrium," Economie Applique, XXIX, 2, 1976, 319-337. 
"Trade with Fiat Money but No Individual Trust--A Preliminary Stage 
towards Banking," forthcoming 1977, in honor of Giovanni Demaria. 
"Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," with L.S. Shapley, 
The Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming 1977, (also CF 40318). 
I I Trade and Prices in a Closed Economy with Exogenous Uncertainty 
Different Levels of Information, Money and Compound Futures Markets," 
with P. Dubey, Econometrica, forthcoming, 1977. 
"Banks, Insurance and Futures Markets, or a Trading Economy with 
Money, Exogenous Uncertainty and an Optimal Bankruptcy Rule," 
Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, ed. R. Henn and 0. Moeschlin, 
Springer Verlag: Berlin, 1977, 668-682. 
"A Closed Economic System with Production and Exchange Modelled as 
a Game of Strategy," with P. Dubey, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 
forthcoming, 1977. 
Working Papers* 
1. On Prices, Fiat Money, Credit and Transferable Utility, CFDP 166, 1/28/64. 
(also Measurable, Transferable and Comparable Utility and Money CFDP 200 
2/8/66.) 
2. A theory of Money and Banking in a General Equilibrium System, RM 48 7/70. 
Institute for Advanced Study, Vienna, Austria. 
3. ~MF~;*part 1 : The General Approach Adopted, CFDP 320, 101 121 71. 
4. TMFI, Part 2: On the Paradox of the Efficient Price System in a 
Completely Centralized Economy and in a Capitalist Individual Ownership 
Economy, CFDP 322, 11/1/71. (Also RAND p-4689, August 1971 .) 
*5. TMFI, Part 3: The Missing Degree of Freedom: Commodity Money and 
Oligopoly in a General Equilibrium Model, CFDP 324, 11/10/71. 
(Published No. 5.) 
*6. TMFI, Part 4: Fiat Money and Noncooperative Equilibrium in a Closed 
Economy, CFDP 330, 2/7/72. (Published No. 3.) 
7. TMFI, Part 5: The Rate of Interest on Fiat Money in a Closed Economy, 
CFDP 338, 4/5/72. (Withdrawn for Revision; also- RAND p-4723, 0ctober 
1971.) 
8. TMFI, Part 6: The Rate of Interest, Noncooperative Equilibrium and 
Bankruptcy, CFDP 334, 4/5/72. (Withdrawn for Revision.) (with 
L.S. Shapley) 
*9. TMFI, Part 7: Money, Trust and Equilibrium Points for Games in 
Extensive Form, CFDP 331, 2/15/72. (Revised version, 1973) (Published 
No. 8.) 
10. TMFI, Part 8: Transactions Costs in a Market Economy, CFDP 336, 4/5/72. 
"11. TMFI, Part 9: Competitive and Controlled Price Economies; the Arrow- 
Debreu Model Revisited, CFDP 337, 4/5/72. (Published No. 9.) 
12. TMFI, Part 10: Some Informal Notes, Preliminary Results and Models 
Relevant to Dynamic Monetary Economies, Preliminary CF-20509, 5/9/72. 
*13. TMFI, Part 11: Trade with Fiat Money but No Individual Trust --A 
Preliminary Stage towards Banking, CFDP 363, 11/6/73. (Revised to be 
Published No. 19.) 
*14. TMFI, Part 12: A Dynamic Economy with Fiat Money without Banking and 
with or without Production Goods, CFDP 364, 11/13/73. (Revised and 
Published No. 10.) 
15. TMFI, Part 13: Trade with Spot Markets, Fiat Money and Internal 
Banking, CFDP 366, 1/18/74. 
* Part 14 is not yet completed. 
** The abbreviation TMFI is used for A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. 
TMFI, Part 15: A Trading Model to Avoid Tantonnement Metaphysics, 
CFDP 368, 2/25/74. (Revised version, May 1974, Published No. 11.) 
TMFI, Part 17: On the Eight Basic Units of a Dynamic Economy with 
Spot and Futures Markets, CFDP 367, 2/8/74. (Published No. 12.) 
The General Equilibrium Model is the Wrong Model and a Noncooperative 
Strategic Process Model is a Satisfactory Model for the Reconciliation 
of Micro and Macroeconomic Theory, CFDP 365, 12/6/73. (Revised 
October 8, 1974, Published No. 13.) 
On the Role of Numbers and Information in Competition, CFDP 371, 
3/13/74. (Published No. 14.) 
TMFI, Part 18: A Noncooperative Model of a Closed Economy with Many 
Traders and Two Bankers, CFDP 374, 3/28/74. (Published No. 16.) 
Some Strategic Models Related to General Equilibrium (with 
L. S. Shapley) , mimeographed RAND, February 21, 1973. 
Trade Using One Commodity as a Money (with L.S. Shapley), mimeograph 
CF-40318, April 18, 1974. (Revised to be published No. 20.) 
TMFI, Part 16: Mathematical Models for a Theory of Money and Financial 
Institutions, CFDP 377, 10/9/74. (Published No. 15.) 
Competitive Equilibrium Contingent Commodities and Information, 
CFDP 379, 10/17/74. (Revised May 1975, see also CF-20322), 
(Published No. 17.) 
TMFI, Part 19: Some Problems and Conjectures Concerning Mathematical 
Models of Money and Financial Institutions without Exogenous 
Uncertainty, CF-50401, April 1, 1975. 
TMFI, Part 20: A Linear Exchange Model with Financial Institutions: 
The Rate of Interest, CF-50416, March 16, 1975. 
TMFI, Part 21: Fiat Money, Bank Money, The Float and the Money Rate 
of Interest, CFDP 394, 5/8/74. 
TMFI, Part 23: Fiat Money, Bank Money, the Force of the Rate of 
Interest and the Vanishing Float, CFDP 395, 5/14/74. 
TMFI, Part 24: Trade and Prices in a Closed Economy with Exogenous 
Uncertainty, Different Levels of Information, Money and Compound 
Futures Markets (with P. Dubey), CFDP 410R, 11/14/75. (Published No. 21.) 
TMFI, Part 26: On the Number of Types of Markets with Trade in Money, 
CFDP 416, 1/14/76. (Revised for Publication April 1977.) 
TMFI, Part 27: Beyond General Equilibrium, CFDP 417, 1/14/76 
(Published No. 18.) 
TMFI, Part 28: The Noncooperative Equilibria of a Closed Trading 
Economy with Market Supply and Bidding Strategies (with P. Dubey) 
CFDP 422, 2/10/76. 
TMFI, Part 30: The Optimal Bankruptcy Rule in a Trading Economy 
Using Fiat Money, CFDP 424, 2/9/76. (Revised 424R with C. Wilson 
6/7/76.) 
A Closed ~conomic System with Production and Exchange Modelled as 
a Game of Strategy (with P. Dubey) CFDP 429, 5/18/76. (Published No. 23.) 
A Dynamic Economy with Shares Fiat, Bank and ~ccounting Money 
(with J.J.M. Evers), CFDP 431, 5/25/76. 
TMFI, Part 31: Banks, Insurance and Futures Markets, CF 60819, 
August 15, 1976. (Published No. 22.) 
TMFI, Part 25: A Closed Economy with Exogenous Uncertainty, 
Different Levels of Information, Money, Futures and Spot Markets, 
(with P. Dubey) CFDP 414, October 11, 1976. 
TMFI, Part 32: Bankruptcy and the Money Rate of Interest instead 
of Excess Supply or Demand, CF-60820, August 25, 1976. 
TMFI, Part 33: On the Value of Market Information, CFDP 439, 
November 9, 1976. 
TMFI, Part 34: A Multiperiod Trading Economy with Fiat Money, 
Bank Money and an Optimal Bankruptcy Rule, CFDP 441. (Withdrawn 
for Revision March 1977.) 
TMFI, Part 35: Bankruptcy and Optimality in a Closed Trading Mass 
Economy Modelled as a Noncooperative Game, (with P. Dubey) CFDP 448, 
February 15, 1977. 
TMFI, Part 36: The Money Rate of Interest, (with P. Dubey) CFDP 
April, 1977. 
TMFI, Part 37: Growth in a Bounded Universe, (with P. Dubey) 
CFDP 1977 
TMFI, Part 22: The Price-Quantity Bid-Offer Model, CFDP 
May 1977. 
3. AN INFORMAL GUIDE TO THE PAPERS 
3.1. General Approach 
On the previous pages a listing is given of approximately twenty pub- 
lished papers and forty working papers on the topic of a theory of money and 
financial institutions. These papers represent work in progress on an attempt 
to construct a theory of money and financial institutions based upon refor- 
mulating the problem of exchange and production among many individuals as an 
n person noncooperative game. 
The stress in this work is upon presenting a complete process model of 
production and exchange which describes economic activities in situations of 
equilibrium and disequilibrium. The rules required to completely specify 
economic trade and production as a well defined game amount to completely 
specifying the rudimentary institutions and processes for the carrying out 
of trade. 
A theory which completely specifies the market mechanisms for physical 
goods and for financial instruments contains a rudimentary description of 
institutions. In other words the rules of the game are tantamount to des- 
cribing the elementary institutions which carry the processes of trade, 
production and the exchange of financial instruments. 
The construction of an adequate theory of money and financial institutions 
calls for the solution of a host of different but related problems. The 
approach adopted here is to devise a great number of models of trade with 
different market mechanisms and different financial institutions in order to 
be able to analyze and isolate related but different aspects of an economic 
system controlled by financial institutions using an array of financial in- 
struments. 
It has been suggested frequently that the essence of the understanding 
of money and financial institutions lies in models of dynamic and subjective 
as well as objective uncertainty. Although I believe that many of the more 
important macroeconomic manifestations of financial behavior are associated 
with subjective uncertainty and the dynamics of economies, it is my belief 
that the first steps which are needed to be taken in the construction of a 
sound theory of money and financial institutions must be taken at a much 
more basic level. 
Specifically the question we must address is where did the Walrasian 
general equilibrium model go wrong when it was fully mathematized? Can we 
find where a money could play a natural role in a simple exchange economy 
with no exogenous uncertainty and with no subjective misperceptions? The 
approach which concentrates on these problems first, is addressed to bridging 
the gap between micro and macroeconomic theory. 
It concentrates on specifying the basic mechanisms which not only describe 
states of disequilibrium but at the same time will under the appropriate cir- 
cumstances be completely consistent with the general equilibrium theory. 
This approach is heavily oriented towards dividing difficulties. There are 
at least eight allied problem areas which must be investigated. These are 
indicated in the tables given below. The forty odd papers noted fit into 
different parts of these tables. There are some areas indicated with an 
asterisk or a cross which indicate work in progress or work not yet attempted. 
The specific way in which I have tried to split the problem is as follows: 
the key technical approach is to view the financial and economic system as a 
noncooperative closed oligopolistic game. In the work discussed here inter- 
national trade and multiple currencies are ignored--not .because I believe 
that they are not important but because I feel that it would be premature 
to start to model the type of international law considerations needed to 
understand the functioning of nation states with independent currency control. 
As Hicks noted in Value and Capital an important gap in value theory was 
the omission of a reasonable theory which included oligopolistic elements. 
The work here attempts to close this gap. The spirit of the approach is to 
start by formulating most problems in terms of finite numbers of individuals 
and finite time periods. A continuum of traders and continuous time are 
introduced with care only where the mathematical simplification is considerable. 
The first set of models are for a finite length of time. If financial in- 
stitutions appear they must be explicitly constructed at one point of time 
and dismantled at the end of the "game1'. In this way one must specify how 
financial instruments get into an economy and eventually get out of the 
economy. The link with general equilibrium theory can be made by replacing 
the finite number of traders by a countable infinity of traders or by a con- 
tinuum. Either of these devices should be looked at as methods for approxi- 
mating the concept of "many traders in a market". 
The eight major lines of investigation followed here are as indicated: 
1. Market mechanisms 
2. Money and credit instruments 
3. Exogenous uncertainty 
a) Insurance 
b) Nonsymmetric information 
c) Subjective probability 
4. Dynamics 
5. Transactions costs 
6. Public goods, government and taxation 
7. Labor as a special commodity 
8. Utility theory requirements 
The bulk of the work completed to date has been on the first four topics. 
The tables not only show the current state of the work but the numbers pre- 
faced by the letter p indicate articles already or about to be published 
while those prefaced by the letter c indicate working papers available. 
Table 1 presents the overall scheme with each subheading leading to a 
more detailed table. The usual programming notation is used to indicate 
cross linkages between topics or articles. Thus an arrow out of a box ].+a 
with a number in a circle indicates a connection noted elsewhere as @+ [ . 
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3.2. Specific Topics 
(1) Market Mechanisms 
The first step towards the creation of models of trade and production 
calls for the explicit description of the methods of trade. At first this 
seems to be a hopelessly institutional problem with the possibility for many 
thousands of different markets or other mechanisms of distribution. Fortu- 
nately when looked at a little more abstractly we may limit our investigation, 
Table la 
- 
Prior to limiting our concern to economic markets, a reasonable question 
to ask is how are goods and resources distributed in society in general? 
Market 
Mechanisms 
On Different Methods for Allocatine Resources (1970) D-1 
The Sell All 
Model 
The Bid Offer 
Mod e 1 
Price-Quantity 
Model 
On the Number 
A Broker-for 
-prof it Model 
This paper describes ten different methods in which resources can 
be allocated. It serves to indicate the different types of market and 
non-market mechanisms as well as the interface between market and political 
mechanisms which must be taken into account in the development of an 
adequate theory of the allocation of economic goods. 
Limi t ing  o u r s e l v e s  t o  economic markets a n  example o f  where t h e  r o l e  
of money i n  exchange had begun t o  pose d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  m~croeconomic 
a n a l y s i s  i s  provided by V i n e r ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  of pecuniary  e x t e r n a l i t i e s .  
Pecuniary  E x t e r n a l i t i e s :  A Game Theore t i c  Ana lys i s  (1971) p-2 
I n  t h i s  paper ,  i t  is shown t h a t  pecuniary  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  a r e  i n  f a c t  
r e a l ,  and a r i s e  from having t r a d e  t a k e  p l a c e  through a  s p e c i f i c  market 
s t r u c t u r e .  The problem i n  t r y i n g  t o  fo rmula te  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o r  
coopera t ive  form of a  t r a d i n g  game i s  used t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o i n t .  
It i s  easy t o  m i s s  t h i s  fundamentally d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t  of par- 
t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  models of t h e  economy i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  c u r r e n t  genera l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  models. I n  t h e  former,  market s t r u c t u r e  and money i s  impli-  
c i t l y  assumed, i n  t h e  l a t t e r ,  market  s t r u c t u r e  and money a r e  r u l e d  o u t .  
Comodi ty  Money, Oligopoly,  C r e d i t  and Bankruptcy i n  a  General  E q u i l i -  
brium Model (1973) p-5 
  his paper p r e s e n t s  a  noncooperat ive  model of a  many-person, many- 
commodity t r a d i n g  economy. Th i s  model s t a n d s  i n  c o n t r a s t  wi th  t h e  gen- 
e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  model which i s  mechan i s t i c  i n  fo rmula t ion ,  and 
t h e  v a r i o u s  c o o p e r a t i v e  t h e o r i e s  of s o l u t i o n  such a s  t h e  c o r e  of a  co- 
o p e r a t i v e  game. These l a t t e r  s o l u t i o n s  i m p l i c i t l y  f i n e s s e  t h e  problem 
of d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  s t r a t e g y  spaces  of t h e  t r a d e r s ,  a s  they go immediately 
t o  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t r a d e  which i m p l i c i t l y  f a i l s  t o  model 
many of t h e  s t r a t e g i c  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h e  a c t i o n s  of t h e  t r a d e r s  forced by 
t h e  p r o c e s s  of t r a d e .  The noncooperat ive  s o l u t i o n  c a l l s  f o r  t h e  de- 
s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  game i n  s t r a t e g i c  form. A s  such,  i t  is  necessa ry  ' t o  
s p e c i f y  i n  t o t a l  d e t a i l  how t r a d e  t a k e s  p lace .  I n  t h i s  model, t h i s  i s  
done and i n  o r d e r  t o  have a  symmetric game wi th  on ly  one market f o r  
each commodity, a n  e x t r a  commodity which s e r v e s  t h e  purposes  of  a  rredium 
of exchange is  in t roduced .  
It i s  observed t h a t  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of a  money a r e  manifes ted  bo th  
i n  t h e  u t i l i t y  s t r u c t u r e  and t h e  s t r a t e g i c  s t r u c t u r e  of  a  market. A 
commodity money i s  a  subs tance  which h a s  u t i l i t a r i a n  i n t r i n s i c  worth t o  
t h e  t r a d e r s  beyond i t s  v a l u e  a s  a  means of exchange. A f i a t  money has  
no i n t r i n s i c  worth. It e x i s t s  a s  a  commodity wi th  s p e c i a l  r u l e s  concerning 
i t s  r o l e  i n  exchange, and hence i n  t h e  de te rmina t ion  of  i n d i v i d u a l  s t r a -  
t e g i e s .  
It i s  noted i n  t h i s  model t h a t  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of a  commodity money 
t o  p l a y  a  s p e c i a l i z e d  r o l e  i n  t r a d e  i s  no t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  guarantee  t h a t  
a  l i m i t i n g  noncooperat ive  e q u i l i b r i u m  ( l i m i t i n g  i n  t h e  s e a s e  of  r e p l i -  
c a t i o n  of types  of t r a d e r s )  w i l l  be  P a r e t o  optimal i n  t h e  sense  of o p t i -  
m a l i t y  i n  a  game wi thou t  t r a d i n g  r e s t r a i n t s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  o p t i m a l i t y ,  
it  i s  necessa ry  t o  e i t h e r  have "enough of t h e  commodity money" he ld  by 
a l l  t r a d e r s  o r  t o  have a  c r e d i t  system which e n a b l e s  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  
f inance  t h e i r  shor t - term purchases .  However, a s  soon a s  one i n t r o d u c e s  
t h e  concept o f  c r e d i t  i t  becomes necessa ry  t o  t a k e  i n t o  account  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  system might evolve  i n t o  a  s t a t e  where a n  i n d i v i d u a l  
cannot  pay back t h e  sums he h a s  borrowed. Thus i n  o r d e r  t o  we l l  d e f i n e  
a  model wi th  c r e d i t ,  bankruptcy r u l e s  o r  r u l e s  which make bankruptcy 
impossible  must be s p e c i f i e d .  These a r e  desc r ibed  i n  (2) of t h i s  s e c t i o n  
under t h e  heading: Money and Cred i t  Ins t ruments .  
This paper does not provide a formal existence proof for the non- 
cooperative equilibrium and its ~ro~erties under replication. This proof, 
due to L. Shapley, will appear i n  a forthcoming joint publication. A 
published version of a highly related proof is given by Dubey and 
Shubik (p-21). 
Trading Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment (1974) (1977) p-20 
This is a basic expository paper with Lloyd Shapley describing in 
detail the noncooperative solution to the model of trade in a market 
with money. The Edgeworth Box is utilized to illustrate the feasible 
set of trades and the effect on the feasible set of permitting credit. 
The problems of modeling bankruptcy are also discussed and a heuristic 
sketch of the general results is given. 
The Non-cooperative Equilibria of a Closed Trading Economy with Market 
Supply and Bidding Strategies (1976) c-33 
In the first model with trade using a commodity as a means of pay- 
ment, for simplicity it was assumed that all commodities must be sold 
in the markets. In this joint paper with P. Dubey a strategy is a vector 
of 2m dimensions, where in each of m markets each individual decides 
both how much to offer for sale and how much he intends to bid. The 
intuitively appealing simplification that an individual will either 
offer or bid in a market, but will not do both is not made. It is shown 
in this paper that when the number of competitors is few it may be 
strategically meaningful to both bid and offer thus creating a market 
that is thicker than otherwise by means of "wash sales". 
The key phenomenon of added interest in this model is the role of 
the volume of trade and its relationship to the thickness of markets. 
A Trading Model to Avoid Tatonnement Metaphysics (1974) p-11 
This is an abstract model of a two-sided auction market. The 
mechanism for price formation is described explictly and a proof is 
given that the competitive equilibiium is among the set of noncooperati.ve 
equilibria for this particular model. It is also observed that this 
model is well suited for experimental work and the results of several 
preliminary experiments are reported. The effect of numbers of competi- 
tors in the market is also reported upon. In particular, it is noted 
that the actual process suggested here is relatively closely related 
to stock market price formation and to the method used for bidding for 
treasury paper. 
The Price-Quantity, Bid-Offer Model (1977) c-44 
This is an extension of the previous paper. It is shown that in a 
market where m commodities are being traded, a noncooperative game where 
each player has a strategy of 4m dimensions can be defined. Each trader 
names a price and quantity at which he will buy and a price and quantity 
at which he will sell. Price is formed at the intersection of the supply 
and demand histograms as illustrated. 
- quantity 
Rationing rules must be specified to take care of excess supply or demand 
at the market price. It is proved that this excess is not greater than 
the supply or demand of a single individual. The noncooperative equili- 
bria form a continuous set which contain the competitive equilibrium 
for all replications. 
On the Number of Types of Markets with Trade in Money (1976,1977 revised) c-30 
In this paper it is shown that when each trader's move is made 
simultaneously then there is only a restricted class of models involving 
actions naming combinations of quantities of goods, quantities of money 
or prices to be bid or offered. The stress here is upon how to regard 
markets as mechanisms which transform bids and offers into prices and 
distributions of goods. The previous papers p-5, p-20, c-32, p-11, c-44 
covering the "sell-a1 lf'model; the "bid-offer" and the "prios-;quaztity bid 
offer" variations all serve to show that the structure of trade may 
make an important difference when numbers are few (or when information 
conditions differ; see 3 .of this section). However the competitive 
equilibria emerge as limiting noncooperative equilibria for many different 
market structures when there are many traders. 
Some Strategic Noncooperative Models  elating to General E,quilibrium (1974) c-21 
These are a set of unpublished notes written jointly with Lloyd 
Shapley in order to formulate the basic mathematical model for the 
proof of the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium in a closed 
trading model with a commodity or fiat money. 
(2) Money and Credit Instruments 
w 
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Given market mechanisms which generate  p r i ce s  and the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of commodities, i f  we pos tu l a t e  t r a d e  i n  a  commodity money i t  i s  easy 
t o  show t h a t  a  shortage of the  money could cause t r ade  which i s  l e s s  
than optimal when compared with the  o r i g i n a l  Pareto optimal sur face  
unconstrained by t h e  need t o  t r ade  i n  a  s p e c i f i c  commodity. 
I n  order  t o  achieve op t imal i ty  t he  shortage of a  means of pay- 
ment may be re l ieved  by the  c r ea t i on  of c r e d i t  o r  of paper money. 
Noncooperative Exchange with a  Continuum of Traders Dubey and Shapley 
(1977) CFDP 447 
The s imples t  way t o  introduce c r e d i t  i s  t~ imagine t h a t  t he  t r ade r s  
a r e  unconstrained i n  t h e i r  bidding. I n  o ther  words they may bid any 
amount of a  numeraire a s  though each has an unlimited l i n e  of c r e d i t  
a t  a  bank. Af te r  t r ade  has taken place and a l l  t r ade r s  have received 
t h e i r  incomes t h e  ru l e s  r equ i r e  t h a t  a l l  t r ade r s  pay back whatever 
they have borrowed. It i s  possible  t h a t  a f t e r  t r ade  the  system i s  i n  
a  s t a t e  such t h a t  it i s  not poss ib le  f o r  every t r a d e r  t o  pay back 
what he owes. A penal ty  must be leveled aga ins t  any ind iv idua l  who 
f a i l s  t o  pay back h i s  debts .  Otherwise the  s t r a t e g i e s  would be un- 
bounded. I f  t h e r e  were no penal ty  f o r  d e f a u l t  every ind iv idua l  could 
revoke h i s  deb ts  with impunity. 
Basing t h e i r  model on those of Shubik and Shapley and of Shubik, 
Pos t le thwai te  and Schmeidler analyzed a  game with a r b i t r a r i l y  high 
pena l t i e s  levied aga ins t  anyone who f a i l s  t o  repay. Dubey and Shapley 
considered s imi l a r  models, but with two d i f fe rences .  Their approach 
t o  the measurabi l i ty  of s e t s  of s t r a t e g i e s  employed by nonatomic 
t r ade r s  d i f f e r s  from Pos t le thwai te  and Schmeidler and the  bankruptcy 
pena l t i e s  r a the r  than being a r b i t r a r i l y  high a r e  introduced a s  para- 
meters. I t  i s  shown t h a t  f o r  any p o s i t i v e  bankruptcy pena l t i e s  t he re  
w i l l  e x i s t  noncooperative e q u i l i b r i a  which y i e l d  the  same a l l oca t ions  
a s  the  competit ive e q u i l i b r i a ,  but t he  p r i c e  l eve l  w i l l  depend upon 
the bankruptcy penal t i e s .  
Trade with F i a t  Money but no Individual  Trust--A prel iminary Stage 
towards Banking (1973), (1977) p-19 
\ 
Several simple models a r e  discussed and contrasted t o  show the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of using hoarding a s  "an Al ice  through the  looking g lass"  
type of banking system. The analogy i s  e a s i e r  t o  see  when we th ink  
of the  p r a c t i c e  of using r i n g s * . i n  auc t ion  bidding. This i s  the  equi- 
va l en t  t o  having var ious  ind iv idua ls  hoard t h e i r  money and thereby 
i m p l i c i t l y  increase  the  purchasing power of o the r s  a t  t he  time they 
a r e  hoarding . 
The Optimal Bankruptcy Rule i n  a  Trading Economy using F i a t  Money 
(with C.  Wilson), (1976) c-33 
A two s t age  model i s  constructed where i n  t h e  f i r s t  s t age  indi-  
v idua ls  b id  personal I . O . U .  notes  i n  r e tu rn  f o r  a  share  of a  f ixed  
amount of money M, suppl ied by a  bank which.may be viewed a s  ou t s ide  
1 
u 
of the game. An ind iv idua l  i wi l l  ob t a in  - M u n i t s  of money where u i 
u 
* Where a  subgroup of i n d i v i d u a l s  co l lude  i n  the  publ ic  auct ion,  then by some 
means a l l o c a t e  the items purchased among themselves p r iva t e ly .  
i s  t h e  amount h e  b i d s .  He i s  then i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t o  b i d  on t h e  goods 
i i i 1 u f o r  s a l e .  He b i d s  (b l ,  ..., bm) where Z b .  < - M. Each i n d i v i d u a l  a t t e m p t s  
J - u  
i i t o  maximize a n  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  form @ . ( x l ,  ..., x ) + 
1 i m i i i i i p min[0,{: M - I b .  + I p . a  - u } ]  where p i s  a  bankruptcy p e n a l t y .  
J J j  
Shubik and Wilson t a k e  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e  wi th  l o g  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  and 
two types  of t r a d e r s  and c a l c u l a t e  t h e  noncooperat ive  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  
i 
a l l  pa ramet r i c  v a l u e s  of t h e  p . It i s  shown t h a t  when t h e  bankruptcy 
p e n a l t i e s  a r e  s e t  equal  t o  t h e  Lagrangian m u l t i p l i e r s  t h e n  under r e p i -  
t i t i o n  t h e s e  a r e  noncooperat ive  e q u i l i b r i a  which approcah t h e  competi- 
t i v e  equ i l ib r ium.  I f  t h e  bankruptcy p e n a l t i e s  a r e  s e t  o t h e r w i s e  then  
hoarding may t a k e  p l a c e  and one o r  both types  of t h e  t r a d e r s  may e l e c t  
t o  p l a y  s t r a t e g i e s  which l e a d  t o  t h e i r  going bankrupt .  
An opt imal  bankruptcy r u l e  i s  one which makes s t r a t e g i c  bankruptcy 
u n p r o f i t a b l e .  
Bankruptcy and Opt imal i ty  i n  a  Closed Trading Mass Economy Modelled a s  
a  N o n c o o ~ e r a t i v e  Game (wi th  P. Dubev). (1977) c-41 
Th i s  paper c o n t a i n s  t h e  f u l l  mathematical  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  and 
p r o o f s  of  t h e  r e s u l t s  noted i n  t h e  paper above. A nonatomic game i s  
d e s c r i b e d  and t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  co inc idence  o r  l a c k  of coincidence 
of c e r t a i n  noncooperat ive  e q u i l i b r i a  wi th  compet i t ive  e q u i l i b r i a  a r e  
p resen ted .  
Bankruptcy and t h e  Money Ra te  of I n t e r e s t  i n s t e a d  of Excess  Supply 
o r  Demand (1976) c-38 
I n  t h e  two papers  noted above, when t h e r e  i s  a n  N.E.* w i t h  some 
i n d i v i d u a l s  becoming bankrupt ,  a p o s i t i v e  money r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  i s  
p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  economy. The r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  i s  only  ze ro  when t h e r e  
i s  a  co inc idence  i n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  between a n  N.E. and a  C.E.** and f u r t h e r -  
more when no i n d i v i d u a l  goes bankrupt.  It  i s  suggested i n  t h i s  b r i e f  
U .  
n o t e  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t  u (M = 1 + U, which can b e s t  be desc r ibed  
a s  a  l o s s  r e s e r v e  charge)  p rov ides  a  measure of t h e  "d i s t ance"  one i s  
from a  C.E. A t  a  C . E .  = 0 .  I f  t h e r e  a r e  k  C E s  t h e n  it i s  p o s s i b l e  
t o  d i v i d e  t h e  P a r e t o  opt imal  s u r f a c e  i n t o  k  zones w i t h  z e r o  a t  t h e  
C.E. b u t  w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  u i n  each zone. 
The a d d i t i o n  of  p roduc t ion  t o  a  noncooperat ive  game model of  
t r a d e  i n t r o d u c e s  s e v e r a l  new phenomena.. A s imple  example s e r v e s  t o  
i n d i c a t e  a  s p e c i a l  r o l e  f o r  a s s e t s  i n  t h e  e n f o r c i n g  of c e r t a i n  non- 
c o o p e r a t i v e  e q u i l i b r i a .  
A Dynamic Economy w i t h  F i a t  Money wi thou t  Banking and w i t h  and wi thou t  
P roduc t ion  Goods (1973),  (1977) p-10 
The important  f e a t u r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  t h i s  model i s  t h a t  a s s e t s  
and ownership paper  w r i t t e n  a g a i n s t  a s s e t s  p l a y  a  c e n t r a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  
* noncompet i t ive  e q u i l i b r i u m  
** compet i t ive  e q u i l i b r i u m  
enforcement of an  e f f i c i e n t  noncooperat ive  equ i l ib r ium.  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
t h e  a s s e t s  can b e  used a s  hos tages  a s  i n  escrow arrangments o r  can be 
sold  o u t r i g h t .  Fur the r  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  e n t a i l  t h e  i s suance  of ownership 
paper a g a i n s t  t h e  a s s e t s  and then p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  ownership paper t o  be 
t r aded  a s  c l a ims  a g a i n s t  t h e  a s s e t s  even though t h e  a s s e t s  themselves 
may n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  p h y s i c a l l y  be  moved. A s imple  two-sided t r a d i n g  
example i s  c a l c u l a t e d  t o  show t h e  va lue  of a s s e t s  a s  hos tages .  
A Closed Economic System wi th  Product ion and Exchange Modelled a s  a 
Game of S t r a t e g y  (wi th  P. Dubey) , (1977) p-23 
A t h r e e  s t a g e  model of  an economy w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l s  who own 
resources  and s h a r e s  i n  f i rms  which a r e  opera ted  by p r o f i t  maximizing 
automata,  i s  examined. I n  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  t h e  f i rms  a r e  a b l e  t o  o b t a i n  
t h e i r  i n p u t s ;  i n  t h e  second s t a g e  they produce and i n  t h e  t h i r d  s t a g e  
a l l  product  i s  sold  t o  t h e  f i n a l  consumers. Trade t a k e s  p l a c e  us ing  
a commodity money. 
A s  t h e  game h a s  s e v e r a l  s t a g e s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  c a r e  must be  taken 
i n  s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  in fo rmat ion  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e s c r i b e  s t r a t e g i e s .  
The c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  developed f o r  which t h e r e  w i l l  e x i s t  noncooperat ive  
e q u i l i b r i a  which c o i n c i d e  wi th  compet i t ive  e q u i l i b r i a .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r  
a new phenomenon appears  i n  t h i s  model which can b e s t  be exp la ined  by 
cons ide r ing  t r a d e  i n  2m r a t h e r  than i n  m goods. It i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
t h e r e  may be a n  i n i t i a l  s h o r t a g e  of supply  of a good a s  a f a c t o r  where 
t h e  good can be  produced. I f  t h i s  happens i t  is  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  i t s  
p r i c e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  i s  higher  than i n  t h e  t h i r d  s t a g e .  
Severa l  b a s i c  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r e  encountered when t r a d e  and pro- 
d u c t i o n  a r e  modelled d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  owner-consumers and f i r m s  run  by 
managers. I n  p a r t i c u l a r :  
(1) I f  t r a d e  i n  s h a r e s  i s  permi t t ed  when does i t  t a k e  p l a c e ?  
(Also when a r e  s h a r e s  ex-dividend?) 
(2) Are t h e  managers of t h e  f i rms  automata o r  s t r a t e g i c  dummies, 
o r  do they have p r e f e r e n c e s  of t h e i r  own? 
(3)  I f  they have p re fe rences  of t h e i r  own, when and how w i l l  t h e i r  
behavior  d i f f e r  from p r o f i t  maximization? 
(4)  What happens t o  t h e  markets i f  s h a r e s  a r e  v o t i n g  s h a r e s ?  
i . e .  i f  a  m a j o r i t y  s h a r e  p o s i t i o n  g i v e s  c o n t r o l  t o  a group 
of s tockho lders?  
(5) What happens t o  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  f l o a t  i n  an  economy of t h i s  
type? It  appears  t o  depend upon t h e  "depth" of  i n d u s t r i a l -  
i z a t i o n ,  i . e .  upon t h e  s i z e  of i r ~ t r a f i r m - s a l e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
t h e  s i z e  of  f i n a l  consumer demand ( a l l  measured i n  money). 
A f u r t h e r  minor d i f f i c u l t y  wi th  t h e  t h r e e  s t a g e s - o n e  pe r iod  model 
wi th  p roduc t ion  i s  t h a t  any c a p i t a l  goods l e f t  over would have z e r o  
worth.  It i s  more o r  l e s s  c l e a r  t h a t  product ion i s  i n t i m a t e l y  connected 
wi th  dynamics and a one pe r iod  model c l e a r l y  d i s t i n c t s  t h i s  a s p e c t  of 
t h e  p rocess .  
Under t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  i t  appears  t o  be p o s s i b l e  t o  
prove t h a t  managers wi th  t h e i r  own p r e f e r e n c e s  may n e v e r t h e l e s s  o p e r a t e  
a  c o r p o r a t i o n  i n  a  w.-:y t h a t  maximizes p r o f i t s .  The s p e c i f i c  necessa ry  
and/or  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  have not  y e t  been developed,  a1 though a  
paper on t h i s  t o p i c  h a s  been s t a r t e d .  
I n  t h e  modeling of t r a d e  wi th  a  banking system t h e r e  i s  a  problem 
posed i n  t h e  d e s i g n  of a  compet i t ive  mechanism which s u p p l i e s  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  amount of money t o  an economy a t  a  compet i t ive  r a t e  of 
i n t e r e s t .  When we examine a  s i n g l e  pe r iod  economy i t  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  
easy  t o  d e v i s e  such a  mechanism and t o  show t h a t  i f  t h e r e  were many 
bankers ,  depending upon t h e  mechanism t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  would equa l  
o r  approach zero .  
I n  t h i s  model d u o p o l i s t i c  banking i s  considered i n  two d i f f e r e n t  
c o n t e x t s .  I n  one c o n t e x t ,  the  bankers  use  p r i c e ,  o r  r a t e - o f - i n t e r e s t ,  
naming s t r a t e g i e s  and i n  t h e  o t h e r  they u s e  q u a n t i t y  o r  c r e d i t - r a t i o n i n g -  
s t r a t e g i e s .  An e x p l i c i t  model i s  worked o u t  showing t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  
t h e  two models and t h e  change i n  t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  considered a s  t h e  
number of t r a d e r s  u t i l i z i n g  t h e  banking f a c i l i t y  i s  inc reased .  
Two problems which have n o t  y e t  been faced a r e  t h e  des ign  of a  
compet i t ive  banking system i n  a  mul t ipe r iod  model and t h e  examination 
of bank r e s e r v e  requirements .  Banking f o r  a  m u l t i p e r i o d  economy appears  
t o  pose a n  e x t r a  d i f f i c u l t y  which i s  n o t  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  one pe r iod  
economy, t h a t  i s  c o n t r o l  over  d e p o s i t s  a s  we l l  a s  l o a n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of r e f i n a n c i n g .  It i s  n o t  c l e a r  ( a t  l e a s t  ko me) t h a t  i t  
i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  d e s i g n  a  m u l t i p e r i o d  model of t r a d e  and p roduc t ion  
w i t h  compet i t ive  banking which produces bo th  a  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  and 
an a p p r o p r i a t e  amount of money. 
The f i n a n c i n g  of  mul t ipe r iod  t r a d e  appears  t o  be  most n a t u r a l l y  
approached by d e v i s i n g  an o u t s i d e  o r  c e n t r a l  bank a long  wi th  an  i n s i d e  
o r  p r i v a t e l y  owned banking system. I n  doing t h i s  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank 
may be i n  a  p o s i t i o n  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  supply  of money which can be 
i s sued  by t h e  i n s i d e  banking system by having r e s e r v e  requirements .  
We have n o t  y e t  s t u d i e d  t h i s  problem t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  a l l i e d  d i f f i -  
c u l t y  posed by t h e  need t o  supply  r u l e s  which e i t h e r  make bank f a i l u r e  
imposs ib le ,  o r  s p e c i f y  what happens when a  bank f a i l s .  
The Rate  of I n t e r e s t ,  Noncooperative Equ i l ib r ium and Bankruptcy (with 
L.S. Shapley) (1972) c-8 (withdrawn f o r  r e v i s i o n )  
This  was a  somewhat premature a t t empt  t o  b u i l d  a  model of a  
"money market" where t h e  banking system i s  noth ing  more than  a  brokerage 
house f o r  t h e  exchange of  p r e s e n t  f o r  one-period-in-the-future money. 
Severa l  t e c h n i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  were n o t  adequa te ly  covered i n  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  v e r s i o n  and t h e  paper h a s  been withdrawn f o r  e x t e n s i v e  r e v i s i o n .  
The Rate  of I n t e r e s t  on F i a t  Money i n  a  Closed Economy (1972) c-7 (withdrawn) 
This  was a  premature  a t t empt  t o  s k e t c h  a  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a  
p o s i t i v e  money r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  which has  been completely superceded 
by more r e c e n t  work. I t  i s  on ly  noted f o r  t h e  sake of completeness 
and i n  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  one should acknowledge o n e ' s  f a l s e  o r  inadequate  
s t a r t s .  
A Theory of Money and Banking i n  a  General E q u i l i b r i m  System (1970) c-2 
Th i s  paper r e p r e s e n t s  an  e a r l y  a t t empt  t o  p i c k  up t h e  main a s p e c t s  
of a  theory  of money and t h e  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  by means of  coopera t ive  
game theory  wi th  s t r e s s  upon t h e  concept of t h e  c a r e  of  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  
game. Although i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  o b t a i n  some r e s u l t s  i n  t h i s  way, t h i s  
approach was abandoned a s  i t  appeared t h a t  t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e  game formu- 
l a t i o n  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  d e t a i l e d  concerning t h e  d e t a i l s  of s t r a t e g i e s  
and t h e  mechanisms of t r a d e  t o  make it a s  good a  dev ice  t o  s tudy  
f i n a n c i a l  phenomena i n  mass markets a s  a r e  s t r a t e g i c  o r  normal form 
models s t u d i e d  f o r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of noncooperat ive  e q u i l i b r i a .  
A Mul t ipe r iod  Trading Economy with  F i a t  Money, Bank Money and an Optimal 
Bankruptcy Rule (1977) c-40 (withdrawn f o r  r e v i s  ion)  
This  paper c o n t a i n s  a  d i s c u r s i v e  d i s c u s s i o n  of many of t h e  problems 
involved i n  modeling a  m u l t i p e r i o d  economy w i t h  t r a d e  and p roduc t ion  
and a  banking system. The model sketched invo lves  a  game played f o r  k  
pe r iods  broken i n t o  2k + 2 s t a g e s .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  of  t h e  f i r s t  
pe r iod  a  supply  of money from an o u t s i d e  bank i s  auc t ioned  o f f  wi th  t h e  
t r a d e r s  b idd ing  u s i n g  I . O . U .  n o t e s .  I n  t h e  second s t a g e  they use  the  
o u t s i d e  money t o  b i d  f o r  s h a r e s  i n  a  bank which may be p r i v a t e l y  h e l d .  
I n  t h e  t h i r d  s t a g e  they borrow from o r  d e p o s i t  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  bank. 
A money r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  f o r  i n s i d e  money i s  s p e c i f i e d  exogenously;  
t r a d e r s  a r e  n o t  r e s t r i c t e d  i n  t h e  amounts they can borrow. I n  t h e  
f o u r t h  s t a g e  each i n d i v i d u a l  b i d s  i n  t h e  markets f o r  goods. I n  a l l  
subsequent  pe r iods  t h e r e  a r e  two s t a g e s ,  r e f i n a n c i n g  and b i d d i n g  f o r  
goods. 
A f t e r  t h e  k  p e r i o d s  a r e  over ;  a t  t h e  s t a r t  of pe r iod  k  + 1 t h e r e  
i s  a  f i n a l  s e t t l e m e n t  which invo lves  t h e  f i n a l  s e t t l i n g  of d e b t s  t o  
t h e  i n s i d e  bank, t h e  d i s s o l v i n g  of t h e  i n s i d e  bank and t h e  paying o u t  
of i t s  c a p i t a l ,  t h e  c a l l i n g  of t h e  o u t s i d e  money supply  and f i n a l l y  
ba lanc ing  of t h e  books and execu t ion  of  t h e  bankruptcy procedure  a g a i n s t  
t h o s e  who cannot  pay t h e i r  d e b t s .  
I n  t h e  a t t empt  t o  we l l  d e f i n e  t h e  mul t ipe r iod  model a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
number of modeling cho ices  must be made, many of which r a i s e  e m p i r i c a l  
problems i n  f i n a n c e .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r  
(1) Should t h e  t r a d e r s  be  a1  lowed u n r e s t r i c t e d  r e f i n a n c i n g ,  o r  
r o l l o v e r  of  l o a n s ?  I f  y e s ,  t h i s  produces a  P m z i  game which 
e n a b l e s  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  pu t  o f f  bankruptcy u n t i l  t h e  end. 
(2) Are t h e  s h a r e s  i n  t h e  i n s i d e  bank f u l l y  a s s e s s a b l e ,  i . e .  a r e  
l o s s e s  a s  we l l  a s  p r o f i t s  flowed through t o  the  s tockho lders?  
(3) Is . acc rua l  accoun t ing  pe rmi t t ed .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h i s  would 
enab le  t h e  i n s i d e  bank t o  r e p o r t  p r o f i t s  i t  h a s  n o t  y e t  
c o l l e c t e d .  For example, i f  an i n d i v i d u a l  a t  t ime 1 borrows 
$1,000 and a t  time 2  he now owes $1,100 he may pay back 
no th ing ,  reborrow $1,100 and t h e  bank r e p o r t s  a  p r o f i t  (booked 
b u t  n o t  r e c e i v e d )  of $100. 
(4) Who runs  t h e  i n s i d e  bank and w i t h  what mot iva t ion?  The 
s i m p l e s t  assumption i s  t h a t  i t  i s  run by a  s t r a t e g i c  dummy 
wi th  no d e c i s i o n  freedom. 
(5) What a r e  t h e  r e s e r v e  requirements  and how a r e  they s e t ?  The 
s i m p l e s t  assumption i s  t h a t  t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  bank t o  
g r a n t  t h e  c r e d i t  is  not  l i m i t e d .  
( 6 )  Do bank r e s e r v e s  e a r n  an i n t e r e s t  payment f o r  the  bank o r  a r e  
they nonearning a s s e t s ?  
(7) Do a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  l i v e  f o r  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  l e n g t h  of t h e  mul t i -  
pe r iod  economy? O r  a r e  t h e r e  g e n e r a t i o n s  w i t h  b i r t h s  and 
d e a t h s  and t h e  p a s s i n g  on of  a s s e t s ?  
(8) When produc t ion  i s  in t roduced i s  t h e  economy open o r  c losed?  
i . e . ,  does  i t  obey laws of  conse rva t ion ,  o r  a r e  t h e  exogenous 
i n p u t s  and o u t p u t s  a t  each p o i n t  i n  t ime? 
The s t r e s s  i n  t h i s  paper i s  on t h e  modeling, w i t h  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
l e f t  t o  t h e  subsequent paper .  
The Money Rate  of I n t e r e s t  (with P.  Dubey), (1977) c-42 
T h i s  paper c o n t a i n s  t h e  mathematical  a n a l y s i s  of  t h e  model desc r ibed  
i n  t h e  p rev ious  paper noted above. There a r e  t h r e e  v a r i a n t s  of mul t i -  
pe r iod  t r a d e  cons ide red .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  only  o u t s i d e  money i s  i s s u e d .  
It i s  shown t h a t  noncooperat ive  e q u i l i b r i a  e x i s t  which c o i n c i d e  i n  t h e  
f i n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of r e s o u r c e s  w i t h  t h e  compet i t ive  e q u i l i b r i a ;  however 
g iven o n l y  s p o t  market  t r a d i n g  and a  f i x e d  money supply  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  
from per iod t o  pe r iod  a r e  a d j u s t e d  by hoarding.  
The second v a r i a n t  i s  t h a t  of  m u l t i ~ e r i o d  t r a d e  wi thou t  
p roduc t ion ,  b u t  wi th  a n  i n s i d e  bank. It i s  shown t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t  two 
s o l u t i o n s  f o r  which noocoperat ive  e q u i l i b r i a  and compet i t ive  e q u i l i b r i a  
co inc ide .  One s o l u t i o n  i s  w i t h  t h e  i n s i d e  money r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  p = 0  
and wi th  no one going bankrupt .  It must b e  noted t h a t  t h i s  i s  almost ,  
b u t  n o t  q u i t e  t h e  same a s  t h e  c a s e  wi th  hoarding.  I n  one i n s t a n c e  a n  
i n s i d e  bank does  n o t  e x i s t ,  i n  t h e  o t h e r  i t  does ,  b u t  w i t h  p = 0  d e p o s i t i n g  
i n  t h e  bank cannot  be  o p e r a t i o n a l l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from hoarding.  
A second s o l u t i o n  e x i s t s  w i t h  p > 0 ;  however, a l though  t h e  d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n  of  r e s o u r c e s  a t  t h e  noncooperat ive  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  t h e  same a s  a t  
t h e  compet i t ive  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  every  t r a d e r  goes bankrupt by a n  amount 
equal  t o  t h e  c o s t  each i n c u r s  i n  f i n a n c i n g  h i s  p a r t  of t h e  f l o a t .  The 
o u t s i d e  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s i z e  of t h e  o u t s i d e  
money supply  and t h e  t o t a l  f l o a t .  
It seems c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e  t h a t  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  should go bankrupt 
i n  a n  economy w i t h  a  p o s i t i v e  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  on i n s i d e  money. A t h i r d  
v a r i a n t  of  t h e  b a s i c  model can be  c o n s t r u c t e d  which avo ids  t h i s  d i f f i -  
c u l t y .  I n  t h i s  v a r i a n t  p roduc t ion  i s  in t roduced .  A t  per iod  k  + 1 a  
s e t  of p r i c e s  nl ,  . . . , n  a r e  announced a s  t h e  " s a l v a g e  va lues"  of  a l l  
m goods of  t h e  s o c i e t y  l e f t  over  a t  k  + 1. We may imagine t h a t  a f t e r  t h e  
economy c l o s e s  down a t  pe r iod  k  a  buyer s t a n d s  ready t o  purchase  l e f t  
over goods in order to use them as capital in starting up an economy 
el sewhere. 
As the firms are modeled as profit maximizers the existence of 
salvage prices encourages them to leave over capital which is sold at 
the end and the profits are paid out to the shareholders of the firms. 
It is shown that given any set of salvage prices there will exist a 
nonnegative rate of interest for which noncooperative equilibria of 
the nonatomic game coincide in the distribution of goods and in relative 
prices with the competitive equilibria and no one goes bankrupt. 
The relaticmship between an inside money rate of interest and 
the value of goods sold in period k + 1 is clearly a relationship be- 
tween the rate of interest and capital stock although as this result 
is obtained from a fixed point argument which is essentially static no 
particular causality pattern is offered. 
Quantitative change may easily imply qualitative change. In 
particular when the number of periods becomes extremely large it becomes 
somewhat difficult to accept the assumption of the existence of a single 
generation of long lived individuals with well defined f $xed utility 
functions. If we accept these fairly implausible assumptions then as 
the time horizon grows we may expect that for bounded economies the 
money rate of interest approaches zero. In a further paper the possibility 
of many generations with both processes and intergenerational transfers 
is considered 
Money, Trust and Equilibrim Points in Games in Extensive Form 
A key element that distinguishes noncooperative from competitive 
equilibria is that the former is much more widely defined and explicitly 
concerned with the nature of self policing systems where individuals may 
have strategic influence on the system. 
When multistage processes are considered the nature of what con- 
stitutes an individual or a joint strategy becomes much more complex than 
it is for single stage processes. In particular it becomes reasonable 
to consider strategies which can be interpreted as containing enforecable 
or nonenforceable threats, promises or otker contingencies. When we do 
so it appears that there is a close relatinnsl.;r, between certain .' 
strategies, contracts and escrow arrangements. 
In particular it can be illustrated that in twn societies which 
are identical in all aspects except that one has more goods suitable 
for use as "hostages" than the other; then for equal levels of trust 
more credit arrangements can be enforced in the former than in the 
latter. 
This paper examines the enforecment of loan agreements in tenns 
of strategies and the types of contracts used to help to enforce the 
repayment of loans. 
On the Eight Basic Units of a Dynamic Economy Controlled by Financial 
Institutions (1975) p-12 
It is suggested here that a useful way of viewing the functioning 
of a modern economy is via eight basic classes of instruments, four of 
which are clearly contracts and the remaining four are essentially not 
contracts. The contracts are naturally derived from the other four 
elements. 
In particular the eight elements are as follows: 
1. Goods 
2. Services 
3. Money (outside or fiat) 
4. Ownership paper (stocks, deeds, etc.) 
5. Futures contracts 
6. Service contracts 
7. Debt 
8. Warrants, calls 
The first four items can each be described by a symbol of the 
variety aL which stands, for example, for the amount a of good k obmed kt 
by individual c at time t. This indicates, a commodity with one owner 
at one point in time. In contrast a contract requires a more compli- 
. . 
cared representation such es (alJ bji ) which can be read as follows: kt' R ,  t+l 
an amount a of good k is given to individual i by j at time t in return 
for an amount b of good R to be delivered to individual j by i at time 
t + 1. 
We may consider a transition matrix which indicates what happens 
to all of these eight items or instruments after the passage of a unit 
of time. Money, ownership paper and goods are transformed into iden- 
tical or similar items; pure services are used up and the contracts, 
if honored are converted into goods, services money or ownership paper. 
It is argued that items such as insurance contracts, bonds, 
pension plan paper, etc....can be regarded as variants of these basic 
instruments. Furthermore many of the papers previously noted are 
specifically devoted to trying to isolate the conditions under which 
the invention of a new financial instrument or institution appears 
to be a logical necessity arising from an attempt to well define the 
rules designed to guide an efficient economic process. 
This paper also presents a sketch of a few crude economic 
statistics merely to indicate where the connections must be made 
between macroeconomics and theoretical microeconomics. 
